Prewar Assessment on Iraq Saw Chance of Strong Divisions proclaims the New York Times.
Fair enough. Most armchair generals would have guessed much the same outcome: namely, that Iraq had a chance of splitting apart, of staying together with difficulty forever, or of becoming a functional democracy within a few years.
The analysis here may have strong empirical foundations, coming from defector interrogations or expert interviews, but the primary outcomes are not much different than a shoot from the hip estimate of Iraq's future. Why has this document become a lightening rod for Democratic anger? Surely I can see these scenarios and -- in spite of potential obstacles -- agree to invade Iraq, arguing instead that the risks outweigh the rewards? Right?
Why then the Sturm und Drang? Is it really a scandal, an example of poor judgement, or of sheer stupidity on Bush's part to invade because a document exists that shows intelligence analysts and academics outlining fragmentation as a potential outcome of the Iraqi war?
Besides the already-so-angry-I-could-spit types, who is bothered by this document's existence? Did I miss something about probability that should alter my view? Help me out.
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